Zero-Sum Games, Arms Races, and Prisoner Dilemmas

What people commonly call involution (neijuan) has several precise theoretical models in academic discourse. They explain the same phenomenon from different angles: everyone works harder, yet no one improves their position.

The most direct theory is the arms race. Two countries compete to build more weapons. One builds one hundred missiles, the other builds two hundred. The first builds three hundred more. In the end, both have exhausted their resources, but the balance of power has not changed. Apply this model to work and study: everyone works longer hours, pursues higher degrees, and collects more certificates, but relative rankings stay the same while absolute returns diminish.

The second theory is the prisoner dilemma. Each individual makes the rationally optimal choice for themselves, but when everyone does the same, the collective ends up worse off. Companies slash prices. Platforms burn cash on subsidies. Workers compete in a race of overtime. Everyone knows this is unsustainable, but no one dares to be the first to stop.

The third theory is the zero-sum game. In a market where the total size is fixed, one person gain is another person loss. When room for growth disappears, competition shifts from making the pie bigger to fighting over the existing pie. The most efficient players win, but overall welfare does not increase.

Together, these three theories paint a complete picture of involution. Understanding them is not about being pessimistic. It is about finding the breakthrough point. The real way out is never about working harder on the same track. It is about switching to a different track, moving fromfighting over existing share to creatingincremental growth, from zero-sum to positive-sum.